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1. Introduction
Background risk should matter. Consider the following extreme example of two stock brokers.
Broker A is paid according to market performance and broker B receives a flat salary. The
benefits from their human capital differ substantially. The expected return of human capital
for Broker A is risky and highly positively correlated with the local stock market returns. Let
us assume that human capital is nontradeable, as for nearly all people. Assume furthermore
that both brokers invest part of their financial wealth into the local stock market. From a
diversification perspective, the different characteristics of their salaries, or in other words their
differences in background risk, should clearly influence their asset allocation decision.
Nevertheless, background risk has been largely ignored in the literature on portfolio choice
for a long time.1 One of the reasons for this may be the lengthy preponderance of the concept
of complete markets. In a complete market every wealth part - risky or not - can be traded. It
is therefore possible to aggregate the value of all assets into one value: Total wealth. The total
wealth can then be split into risky and riskless investments.
Recently, researchers have started addressing portfolio choice in the presence of nontradable
income in more detail. Theorists analyze complex models where an investor has to decide
about the asset allocation in the presence of nontradeable wealth parts (see e.g., Viceira, 2001,
and Campbell and Viceira, 2002). An expected utility maximizer is usually assumed in these
models. There is also a growing empirical literature considering portfolio choice in the presence
of nontradeable income from a descriptive perspective (see e.g., Heaton and Lucas, 2000a,
Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002, and Degeorge et al., 2004). The majority of these studies utilize data
from large consumer surveys. We briefly review both parts of the literature in the next section.
This paper deals with the descriptive aspects of the decision problem. We aim to add to
the existing literature with an experimental analysis. Field data studies face the problem that
nontradeable wealth parts should be assessed at the individual level. Even if a sufficiently
detailed data set is available, the core problem to exactly quantify the background risk and to
estimate the correlation structure with tradeable assets remains. The issue therefore leads itself
to an experimental investigation. In an experiment we can systematically vary the factors of
interest (i.e. the amount of nontradeable wealth and the correlation structure) and analyze the
responses of our subjects. Especially, this analysis leads to within-subject data. The results
of experiments can therefore add to the growing empirical literature on portfolio choice in the
presence of nontradeable income and enhance our understanding of this important issue. In
1An early exception is Mayers (1972); another example for incorporating background risk is Pratt and Zeck-
hauser (1987).
1
this sense, the results of an experiment with control of the amount of background risk and the
concrete risk structure completes existing field data evidence.
Motivated by recent theoretical research, the decision-making problem of the investor con-
sidered in theoretical models is simplified to a buy-and-hold problem. Every subject had two
investment possibilities, i.e. a risk-free investment opportunity and a risky asset, modelled as a
discrete random variable with two possible outcomes. The wealth of our subjects consisted of
two parts. The nontradeable wealth part could either be risk-free or risky (background risk).
The other part was financial wealth while the decision variable was the proportion of financial
wealth invested in the risky option. In many cases, we observed a behavior which is quali-
tatively consistent with the predictions of normative theory. However, correlations between
financial and nontradeable wealth are neglected. In a second treatment, subjects had to invest
in one investment opportunity. Explicit asset allocation decisions were not considered, but they
could change the risk profile of the only available investment by varying the position of a slider.
The trick is that changing the risk profile via the slider was equivalent to choosing the propor-
tion of financial wealth in the first treatment in terms of final wealth. The program computed
the “aggregated risk profile”, i.e. the joint probability, the resulting total wealth, the absolute
change in wealth, and the percentage change in wealth for every possible state of the world.
The computation of aggregated risk profiles helps subjects to partly overcome the deviations
from normative theory due to negligence of correlations.
Common caveats against portfolio choice experiments address the subject pool and the rela-
tively low monetary incentives. We will discuss these general objections against an experimental
investigation after the presentation of our study.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review related literature on portfolio
choice and briefly discuss the usefulness of an experimental approach. Section 3 describes our
experimental design in detail and Section 4 reports the results. We discuss the two mentioned
major caveats against the experimental investigation of portfolio choice problems in Section 5
and Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Portfolio Choice Literature
Much of the work on portfolio choice is inspired by the classic papers of Samuelson (1969)
and Merton (1969). They analyze dynamic multiperiod models with an investor optimizing
his consumption stream. There are a risky asset with i.i.d. returns and a riskless investment
opportunity. In complete market models Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) show that the
optimal asset allocation does not depend on the length of the investment horizon. A multiperiod
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investor chooses the same allocation as a single period investor with the same risk preference.
However, relaxing the rigid assumption of the above models results in very different conclu-
sions (see Campbell and Viceira, 2002, for a comprehensive survey). We review the important
insights concerning portfolio choice in the presence of nontradeable labor income which moti-
vated our study in the next subsection.
2.1. The Adjustment Effect, the Horizon Effect, and the Correlation Effect
The Adjustment Effect
A natural starting point when thinking about portfolio choice in the presence of nontradeable
labor income is a decision problem where the investor is certain to receive nontradeable future
payments. Bodie et al. (1992) examine this situation and their main argument may best be
explained by giving an example.
Consider an investor A with a total wealth of $800,000. Let us first assume that this investor
lives in a world with a complete capital market, i.e. every part of her wealth is tradeable. Let us
further assume that she prefers to invest fifty percent of her wealth ($400,000) in the risky asset.
We call this the total or desired risk position (trp). Next, consider an investor B with identical
risk preferences and identical total wealth. The only difference between A and B is that part
of B’s wealth is nontradeable and riskless. Bodie et al. (1992) show that this part of his wealth
is then equivalent to holding the riskless asset. In other words, the nontradeable wealth part is
economically an implicit investment in the riskless asset in the amount of the present value of
the future payments. How do A and B differ in their investment policy? Both desire the same
total risk position. If investor B is implicitly invested in the riskless asset, he must allocate
his remaining financial wealth more heavily to the risky asset to ensure that he achieves the
desired risk position. Assume that B’s total wealth consists of $400,000 of a tradeable and a
nontradeable part, respectively. Then he has to invest his entire financial wealth into the risky
asset (see table 1 below).
Table 1: Possible Preference and Wealth Position of a Hypothetical Investor. The table shows
the possible preference and wealth position of a hypothetical investor B.
Investor B Total Wealth Nontradeable Financial Wealth
Total $800,000 $400,000 $400,000
Riskless Asset $400,000 $400,000 $0
Risky Asset $400,000 $0 $400,000
The only difference between investors A and B is that B cannot trade part of his wealth.
As a result A invests fifty percent of her financial wealth in the risky asset, while B invests one
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hundred percent of his financial wealth in the risky asset. Higher nontradeable riskless wealth
parts lead to a higher proportion of financial wealth invested in the risky asset provided that
total wealth is left constant. We will call this the “adjustment effect” throughout the paper.
The Horizon Effect
Viceira (2001) studies a dynamic model of optimal consumption and portfolio choice in the
presence of background risk. He shows that in the important case of uncorrelated background
risk, investors with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)2 preferences invest a larger fraction
of their savings in the risky asset compared to a decision situation without background risk.
A “one percent negative shock in their financial wealth does not fully translate into a one
percent decrease in their consumption growth” (Viceira, 2001, page 445), whereas it does so
for investors without an uncorrelated second source of income. We will call this result the
“horizon effect” because it has some relevance for the ongoing discussion if investors with long
horizons should allocate more heavily to risky assets. Younger investors have to carry more
(uncorrelated) background risk and own lower financial wealth than older people. The bulk
of their background risk is in most cases the uncertain benefits of human capital. The result
therefore provides a rational argument for younger people with a longer investment horizon to
hold a riskier portfolio.
In some sense, the horizon effect is also a risk effect. It addresses a situation where the
investor has to carry relatively more background risk. Note, that this increase in risk has to
be distinguished from a mean preserving spread in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
Gollier and Pratt (1996) and Gollier (2001) discuss such issues in the presence of background
risk theoretically.
The Correlation Effect
Viceira (2001) further examines the influence of the correlation between the background
risk and the risky asset on the asset allocation decision. All things being equal, a negative
correlation leads to a higher exposure to the risky asset. In such a situation holding more
of the risky asset serves as a hedge against negative background income realizations. Above
average realizations of the risky asset tendentiously arise with below average realizations of the
background risk. Holding a given amount of the risky asset results in a relatively less volatile
time path of consumption opportunities in the case of a negative correlation. Therefore the
investor would like to act in a less risk averse fashion. The opposite is true for a positive
correlation. Under this condition the extra demand is negative, i.e. the investor reduces his
2The solution of the problem is ambiguous for some other utility functions and depends on the exact specifica-
tion of the decision problem. See Gollier (2001) for a brief discussion and two numeric examples on background
risk and time horizon in a dynamic context without a consumption/saving decision.
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holdings of the risky asset. These extra demands are usually called hedging demands in the
literature. As a result, the optimal proportion of the risky asset is negatively related to the
correlation between the background risk and the risky asset. We will call this the “correlation
effect”.
The experiments reported in this paper aim to address the three described effects descrip-
tively. Before moving to the details of our experimental design in Section 3, we briefly mention
other closely related literature.
2.2. Other Related Literature
Portfolio choice in the presence of nontradeable income has been discussed from a descriptive
point of view on the basis of large consumer surveys.3 The most prominent example is the
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) in the USA. Among other things, people were asked about
their asset allocation decisions. Researchers then construct a variable which approximately
measures the exposure to a nontradeable risk and they analyze the relationship between the
variable and the asset allocation decisions. Examples for variables of interest are the variability
of income (Guiso et al., 1996), entrepreneurial risk (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) and housing (Faig
and Shum, 2002). Heaton and Lucas (2000b) survey this literature. The results are in many
cases in line with theoretical predictions, for example Guiso et al. (1996) find that households
reporting a large income variability hold less risky portfolios. However, finding the “correct”
proxy to quantify background risk is one core problem of this literature. Some studies also try
to estimate the impact of a non-zero correlation between the asset and the exogenous risk. The
results are mixed. Heaton and Lucas (2000a) find evidence for a qualitatively rational response
and justify the result with classic economic theory. In contrast, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) does
not detect a similar correlation effect and Massa and Simonov (2002) find a reverse correlation
effect, i.e. they document the opposite behavior compared to the normative prediction. Further
research is needed in this field to reconcile the conflicting evidence.
Experimental investigation of portfolio choice behavior has been started at the latest with
Gordon et al. (1972). Kroll et al. (1988), Kroll and Levy (1992) and Levy (1997) report the
results from experimental tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Among other
things, they investigate responses to different correlations between assets. We are not aware of
any other experimental study dealing with strategic asset allocation decisions in the presence
of two wealth sources and the consideration of background payments is therefore the unique
contribution of this paper.
3A recent exception is Degeorge et al. (2004). They use a database of current and former employees of France
Telecom.
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3. Experimental Design
Obviously we have to simplify the dynamic decision problem faced by an investor in theoretical
studies for our experiments. First, we consider a finite time horizon and abstract from retirement
and bequest. Second, we are not interested in saving/consumption decisions. In most cases, the
portfolio decision in the presence of nontradeable income should not be independent from the
saving decision. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Third, we consider buy-and-hold
decisions. We therefore factor out any effects driven by the dynamic nature of the investment
problem. Campbell and Viceira (2002) provide a formal treatment of the buy-and-hold case
which shows that the qualitative intuitions concerning the effects considered here are captured
by our design. We now turn to the details of our design. The experiments consist mainly of
two treatments. We start with treatment A.
Every subject had two investment opportunities. The risky asset was a discrete random
variable with two possible outcomes. The amount invested in the risky asset, which we also call
lottery, could increase in value by 20% or decrease in value by 10%. The amount assigned to
the riskless asset increased in value by 3%. No explicit investment horizon was specified.
Wealth consisted of two parts. We called one part “exogenous income”. This part could
be risky or riskless. In any case, it was nontradeable. Subjects could not trade or insure
against this wealth part. The other part was financial wealth. The decision variable was
the proportion α of financial wealth invested in the lottery. Borrowing and short sales were
allowed as long as −100% ≤ α ≤ 400% holds. The restrictions for α were chosen after some
simulations which showed that an investor with a plausible degree of risk aversion frequently
chooses highly leveraged positions. Short sales were also possible under plausible assumptions.
In every decision situation4 total wealth, the sum of financial wealth and exogenous income,
was 1,000,000 DM (abbreviation: 1,000 TDM). Note that a risk-seeking or risk-neutral investor
will chose α = 400%, because the expected value of the lottery is 5% and the riskless investment
opportunity guarantees only 3%.
We next describe the situations with a riskless exogenous income relating to the adjustment
effect. Every possible outcome of the lottery could occur with a probability of 1/2. Subjects
were confronted with this situation for exogenous incomes of 0 TDM, 400 TDM, and 800 TDM.
Exogenous income increased in value by 3% over the investment period. Financial wealth was
then 1,000 TDM, 600 TDM, and 200 TDM, respectively. Because of the segregated description
of the decision problem, we call the situations seg0:0:0, seg1:400:0, and seg2:800:0. The number
4We use the terms decision situation and decisions task synonymously throughout the paper to mean one
specific decision problem within one treatment.
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after the first colon gives the amount of exogenous income and the zero after the second colon
indicates that the background payments are riskless. We define further αsegi:y:q as the response
of one specific subject and αˆsegi:y:q as the median response of all subjects to decision situation
segi:y:q.
The riskless exogenous income is economically an implicit investment in the riskless asset.
The higher the exogenous income, the higher α must be to reach the desired risk position (Bodie
et al., 1992). This brings us to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: αˆseg0:0:0 < αˆseg1:400:0 < αˆseg2:800:0
We now turn to the case of a risky decision situation. Figure 1 illustrates the problem.
Figure 1: Risky Exogenous Income. The diagram demonstrates the decision problem in the case of a
risky exogenous income.
1/ 2
1/ 2 +20%
-10%
1
+3%
Financial Wealth
Lottery
Riskless Investment Opportunity
Exogenous Income
TDM xxx
Total Wealth: TDM 1,000
1-q
 q +20%
-10%
1-q +20%
-10%
 q 
TDM yyy
The nontradeable wealth part could either increase in value by 20% or decrease in value
by 10%. Every possibility could occur with a probability of 1/2. The amount assigned to the
lottery could again increase in value by 20% or decrease in value by 10%. One important aspect
of our design is the conditional probability q. q denominates the probability of a gain (loss)
in the lottery given that a gain (loss) in the exogenous income has occurred. 1-q equals the
probability of a gain in the lottery given that a loss in the exogenous income has occurred.
Let us first consider the case of q being equal to 1/2. This is the case of two independent
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risks. The realization of the exogenous income does not influence the probability distribution
of the lottery.
The independent case is of relevance for the horizon effect. If we increase the amount of
background risk, subjects should invest a higher proportion of financial wealth into the lottery.
A ten percent drop in financial wealth does on average not fully translate into a ten percent drop
in final wealth. This is the basic intuition transferred from Viceira (2001) to our buy-and-hold
problem. We again use the amounts of 400 TDM and 800 TDM for the exogenous income. The
two new decision situations are denominated as seg4:400:1/2 and seg7:800:1/2.5 The fraction
after the second colon gives the value of q and indicates in this case the zero correlation. The
horizon effect predicts the behavior stated in hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: αˆseg0:0:0 < αˆseg4:400:1/2 < αˆseg7:800:1/2
We now turn to the correlation effect. Consider the independent case (q=1/2). A change
of the conditional probability q introduces a correlation between the two risk sources.6
For q < 1/2 it is more likely that a gain in the background risk occurs with a loss in the
lottery and that a loss in the background risk occurs with a gain in the lottery. This is the
case of a negative correlation. Because of the negative correlation a larger amount invested in
the lottery serves as a hedge against undesirable realizations in the background risk. A positive
hedging demand results. The opposite is true for a positive correlation (q > 1/2). The two
realizations of the random variables tend to move together. This induces a negative hedging
demand. We use q = 1/4, q = 1/2, and q = 3/4 for a background risk of 400 TDM (seg3:400:1/4,
seg4:400:1/2, seg5:400:3/4) and for a background risk of 800 TDM (seg6:800:1/4, seg7:800:1/2,
seg8:800:3/4).
Note that the unconditional probability of a gain in the lottery is the same for every condi-
tional probability q and that the two sources of wealth are additively linked. This excludes a
wealth effect similar to Samuelson (1991)’s study of portfolio choice in the presence of non i.i.d.
returns.
The basic intuition, again transferred from Viceira (2001), is that a negative correlation
reduces ceteris paribus the variance of final wealth and leads therefore to a higher acceptance
of lottery risk. The reverse result should hold for a positive correlation.
Our design allows us to test the correlation effect for two different amounts of background
5The reason for the not consecutively numbered decision situations will be obvious after the description of
the correlation effect.
6Samuelson (1991) also uses conditional probabilities to model correlations in a portfolio choice context.
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risk. The theoretical literature predicts αˆseg3:400:1/4 > αˆseg4:400:1/2 > αˆseg5:400:3/4 and
αˆseg6:800:1/4 > αˆseg7:800:1/2 > αˆseg8:800:3/4 under common conditions on the utility function.
However, experimental studies have shown that correlations are neglected under various cir-
cumstances (Kroll et al., 1988, Kroll and Levy, 1992, Lipe, 1998, Siebenmorgen and Weber,
2003). Although we use a different communication of correlations, we have no a priori reason to
assume that different correlations should lead to different decisions in contrast to the existing
results. We therefore formulate hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: no difference between αˆseg3:400:1/4/αˆseg4:400:1/2/αˆseg5:400:3/4
and αˆseg6:800:1/4/αˆseg7:800:1/2/αˆseg8:800:3/4.
We had a second treatment to investigate the behavior of our subjects further. Treatment B
put the subjects in nine decision situations which are equivalent in terms of final wealth changes
to the nine decision problems in treatment A. The framing was different.
Two major considerations motivate the second treatment. First, we principally aim to
replicate the effects using a different framing which would show the robustness of the results. The
second reason deals with the correlation effect. As stated above, experimental studies document
neglect of correlations. One explanation may be that people are not able to correctly take into
account the correlation structure due to cognitive limitations. The main idea of treatment
B is therefore to compute “aggregated risk profiles”. The program used for conducting the
experiments explicitly computed the joint probability and the total wealth position for every
state of the world and therefore clearly showed the impact of the correlation. Our hypothesis is
that people will correctly take the correlation structure into account under such circumstances.
The second treatment may at best be explained by giving an example.
Consider the case of background risk. Now assume an arbitrary α ∈ [−100; 400]7. Then
there are four possible states of the world. The probability and the final wealth position for
every state of the world can be easily computed and are shown in figure 2. Subjects in treatment
B were told that they have to invest 1,000 TDM in one lottery and they could change the risk
profile by varying the position of a slider. The trick was that one position of the slider equals one
possible α in treatment A. The computer program computed the final wealth positions for this
α. Subjects varied the slider, the program updated the final wealth positions and so on. This
procedure continued until subjects found their preferred risk profile. As a result, we obtained
a slider position which matches exactly to one α in treatment A. Put differently, treatment
A and treatment B are equivalent in terms of final wealth. We denominate the nine decision
7When we talk about α-allocations in the rest of the chapter, we will drop the “%”-sign for the sake of
convenience. For example, we write αseg0:0:0 = 80 instead of αseg0:0:0 = 80%.
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situations in treatment B as agg0:0:0 to agg8:800:3/4. A fully rational response is therefore
αsegj:y:q = αaggj:y:q ∀j. Screen shots for treatment B can be found in Appendix A.2.8
Figure 2: General Design - Treatment B. The diagram illustrates the general experimental design
for treatment B. y stands for the amount of background risk and x for the amount of financial wealth.
x    1  0.2   x   1       1  0.03   y   1  0.2 
x  	   1  0.1   x   1       1  0.03   y   1  0.1 
x  	  1  0.2   x   1       1  0.03   y   1  0.1 
x  	  1  0.1   x   1       1  0.03   y   1  0.2 
1 
 2   q
1 
 2   q
1 
 2    1  q 
1


2    1

q
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We believe that people react qualitatively according to the theory by the use of aggregated
risk profiles and thus formulate hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3a: αˆagg5:400:3/4 < αˆagg4:400:1/2 < αˆagg3:400:1/4 and
αˆagg8:800:3/4 < αˆagg7:800:1/2 < αˆagg6:800:1/4
For the other two effects of interest, we have no reason to believe that the aggregated description
of the decision problem would change the results.
Hypothesis 1a: αˆagg0:0:0 < αˆagg1:400:0 < αˆagg2:800:0
Hypothesis 2a: αˆagg0:0:0 < αˆagg4:400:1/2 < αˆagg7:800:1/2
Table 2 provides a summary of all decision situations of the described experiment.
One important empirical question, which is not addressed in this paper, is the reaction
to an increase in the exogenous and endogenous risk. We conducted a second experiment to
investigate this important question, where we define an increase in risk as a substitution of the
two possible outcomes 20% and -10% by 40% and -30% for the exogenous or the endogenous
income part. A detailed analysis of the results of experiment 2 can be found in Klos and Weber
(2004). However, the parameters used in experiment 2 are helpful to gather further evidence
concerning the correlation effect. This experiment uses exactly the same experimental setup
including the two treatments A and B as described above. Only the amount of background
risk and the risk structure of the the two sources of income are varied, and the risk free rate is
increased to 5%. Table 3 describes the decision situations in the second experiment.
8This slider technique was first used by Langer and Fox (2004) in a different context.
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Table 2: Every Considered Decision Situation in Experiment 1. This table describes every con-
sidered decision situation in experiment 1. Exogenous income could be riskless or risky, the amount of
background risk varies between 0 TDM and 800 TDM and the possible values for q are 1/4, 1/2, and
3/4.
decision situation exogenous income in the amount of q
seg0:0:0 agg0:0:0 - 0 TDM -
seg1:400:0 agg1:400:0 riskless 400 TDM -
seg2:800:0 agg2:800:0 riskless 800 TDM -
seg3:400:1/4 agg3:400:1/4 risky 400 TDM 1/4
seg4:400:1/2 agg4:400:1/2 risky 400 TDM 1/2
seg5:400:3/4 agg5:400:3/4 risky 400 TDM 3/4
seg6:800:1/4 agg6:800:1/4 risky 800 TDM 1/4
seg7:800:1/2 agg7:800:1/2 risky 800 TDM 1/2
seg8:800:3/4 agg8:800:3/4 risky 800 TDM 3/4
Important for the issues discussed in this paper is that we can investigate three decision
situations where all parameters are exactly the same with the exception of the conditional
parameter q. These decision situations are seg10:500:1/4 to seg12:500:3/4 (agg10:500:1/4 to
agg12:500:3/4), seg13:500:1/4:exo to seg15:500:3/4:exo (agg13:500:1/4:exo to agg15:500:3/4:exo),
and seg16:500:1/4:end to seg18:500:3/4:end (agg16:500:1/4:end to agg18:500:3/4:end). We can
therefore test our hypotheses about the correlation effect out of sample for experiment 2 with
a different subject pool.
We now formulate our additional hypotheses for the second experiment. Again, we expect
that correlations are largely neglected in treatment A and that a qualitatively rational response
is observable in treatment B.
Hypothesis 3˜: no difference between αˆseg10:500:1/4/αˆseg11:500:1/2/αˆseg12:500:3/4 and
αˆseg13:500:1/4:exo/αˆseg14:500:1/2:exo/αˆseg15:500:3/4:exo and
αˆseg16:500:1/4:end/αˆseg17:500:1/2:end/αˆseg18:500:3/4:end
Hypothesis 3˜a: αˆagg12:500:3/4 < αˆagg11:500:1/2 < αˆagg10:500:1/4 and
αˆagg15:500:3/4:exo < αˆagg14:500:1/2:exo < αˆagg13:500:1/4:exo and
αˆagg18:500:3/4:end < αˆagg17:500:1/2:end < αˆagg16:500:1/4:end
We used the following randomization procedure to prevent order effects. In a first step, we
drew a random sequence for the occurrence of the possible treatments, so that some subjects
had to think about treatment B before the decision problems in treatment A were presented,
while for other subjects the ordering was the other way around.9 Next, we randomized the
9Both experiments consisted not only of the two described treatments. We had one additional task in experi-
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Table 3: Every Considered Decision Situation in Experiment 2. This table describes every con-
sidered decision situation in experiment 2. Exogenous income could be riskless or risky, the amount
of background risk is e 500,000 and the possible values for q are 1/4, 1/2, and 3/4. In some decisions
situations we consider an increase in risk. An increase in risk is defined as a substitution of the two
possible outcomes 20% and -10% by 40% and -30%. We used e instead of DM in the second experiment
as a currency unit.
decision situation increase in risk exogenous income q
riskless exogenous income in the amount of e 500,000seg9:500:0 agg9:500:0
riskfree rate on exogenous income: 5%
seg10:500:1/4 agg10:500:1/4 no e 500,000 1/4
seg11:500:1/2 agg11:500:1/2 no e 500,000 1/2
seg12:500:3/4 agg12:500:3/4 no e 500,000 3/4
seg13:500:1/4:exo agg13:500:1/4:exo yes (exogenous) e 500,000 1/4
seg14:500:1/2:exo agg14:500:1/2:exo yes (exogenous) e 500,000 1/2
seg15:500:3/4:exo agg15:500:3/4:exo yes (exogenous) e 500,000 3/4
seg16:500:1/4:end agg16:500:1/4:end yes (endogenous) e 500,000 1/4
seg17:500:1/2:end agg17:500:1/2:end yes (endogenous) e 500,000 1/2
seg18:500:3/4:end agg18:500:3/4:end yes (endogenous) e 500,000 3/4
sequence of the different decision tasks within every treatment, so that every decision situation
could appear at any position with equal probability. This randomization procedure was applied
to every subject at the start of the computerized experiment to exclude a systematic bias due
to a special ordering of the decision situations. We also explicitly verified if the ordering of
the treatments influenced behavior. There is no systematic difference between subjects which
started with treatment A compared to participants which started with treatment B.
4. Experimental Results
We conducted experiment 1 at the University of Mannheim in December 2001. Participants
were 38 voluntary graduate students from the course “Aktienmarkt & Bo¨rse” (stock market and
stock exchange) and it took approximately 40 minutes to complete the experiment. They were
well-educated in finance and they were familiar with the concepts of short sales, conditional
probabilities, and correlations.
Every subject was paid for participation. After the experiment we randomly selected one
decision and played out the lottery based on the asset allocation the subject had chosen in this
decision situation. Payments ranged from 9 DM to 21 DM with the average payment about
14.50 DM ($1 was about 2.20 DM at the time of the experiment).
ment 1 (elicitation of certainty equivalents) and two additional tasks in experiment 2 (binary lottery choices and
one additional asset allocation task). The purpose of these additions is not directly related to the issue of this
paper.
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The median age was 24, and 7 out of 38 subjects were female. All subjects were asked to
rate the factor of understandability of the instructions on a scale from 1 to 9. The median
response is 7.5, so we are certain that the subjects understood the instructions and the decision
situations.
The second experiment was also conducted at the University of Mannheim. Subjects were
again recruited from the course “Aktienmarkt & Bo¨rse” and 51 agreed voluntary to participate.
The experiment took place in January 2003 and payments ranged from e5 to e15 with a mean of
about e10. The arrangement of payments to the subjects was analogous to the first experiment.
11 of 51 subjects were female and the median ranking for the factor of understandability was 8.
As was described in Section 3, we have two treatments each with nine decision situations
in experiment 1. Every decision situation in treatment A has its equivalent complement in
treatment B. As one might expect, allocations in both treatments differ. Therefore, we mainly
report on separate tests and analyze differences between the two treatments in Section 4.4.
To test the hypotheses 1 to 4, we perform a nonparametric test for ordered hypothesis as
introduced by Page (1963). This statistical method tests the null hypothesis
H0 : αˆdecision situation x = αˆdecision situation y = αˆdecision situation z
against the ordered alternative
H1 : αˆdecision situation x < αˆdecision situation y < αˆdecision situation z,
with decision situation x, decision situation y, and decision situation z denominating a specific
decision situation in the experiment (e.g., seg0:0:0, seg1:400:0, and seg2:800:0 to test hypothesis
1). The Page test is therefore especially suitable for our experimental design. We report the
value of the test statistic L and compute corresponding approximate p-values based on the χ2L-
statistic given in Page (1963).10 For pairwise comparisons, we use the Wilcoxon matched pairs
signed rank test. The reported tests use within-subject data. However, for the sake of com-
pleteness we report the arithmetic means, medians, and standard deviations for every decision
situation in Appendix B.
10Page (1963) shows that this approximation works very well, especially in cases like ours. See Wellek (1989)
for computing exact p-values.
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4.1. The Adjustment Effect
We start our analysis with treatment A. A Page test strongly rejects the null hypothesis in
favor of hypothesis 1 (L = 505; p = 0.0000***).11 A look at all possible Wilcoxon tests further
supports our hypothesis (see table 4).
Every pairwise comparison is highly significant in the predicted direction. So, we conclude
that hypothesis 1 is strongly confirmed in treatment A.
For treatment B the null hypothesis of a Page-test can also be rejected at a high significance
level (L = 487; p = 0.0002***). But the Wilcoxon tests given in table 4 show that this effect is
mainly driven by the responses to decision situation agg2:800:0. There is virtually no difference
between the responses under the condition agg0:0:0 and agg1:400:0.
Our design made it possible for every subject to choose approximately the same desired
risk position under conditions seg0:0:0 to seg2:800:0 and agg0:0:0 to agg2:800:0. This has the
advantage that on the basis of one response we can calculate the two other optimal allocations
in this treatment for all decision tasks under consideration. Note that the calculation can be
done without knowledge of a specific preference calculus. Whatever it is that leads to a specific
desired risk position in decision situation seg0:0:0, the same mechanisms should be at work under
decision situation seg1:400:0 as long as the final wealth positions are the relevant parameters
for the decision maker.12 We are then able to calculate the necessary αseg1:400:0 which leads to
the same desired risk position as the chosen αseg0:0:0. This is a special feature of the adjustment
effect, which does not apply to any other effect in the paper.
How many subjects - if any - chose consistently in the described sense? This question is not
as easy to answer as it might seem at first glance. We must know which allocation the subject
truly prefers. If the response to seg0:0:0 is the true preference, we will be able to compute the
correct response to seg1:400:0 and seg2:800:0 directly. But why shouldn’t be the response to
seg1:400:0 be the true preference? Working within a deterministic framework obviously doesn’t
allow a rigid analysis of this issue.
11We use the symbols * for significant at the 5%-level, ** for significant at the 1%-level, and *** for significant
at the 0.1%-level throughout the paper.
12Mental accounting (Thaler, 1999) is one descriptive concept which could prevent subjects from the final
wealth perspective. However, mental accounting would predict αˆseg0:0:0 = αˆseg1:400:0 = αˆseg2:800:0, which is
clearly not supported in our data for treatment A. In treatment B, the aggregate description of the decision
problem rules out any kind of influence of mental accounting.
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Recently, researchers have started dealing with closely related problems by assuming that
decisions makers act according to a specific decision rule plus an error term (see e.g., Harless
and Camerer, 1994 and Hey and Orne, 1994). Although the methodology used in these studies
is not transferable to our problem, we employ a data analysis method which is motivated by
this literature.
We first give the basic intuition for the following analysis. Assume that subjects act accord-
ing to a specific preference calculus, which results in an optimal total risk position. Assume
furthermore that subjects are not able to express their true preference. They make a mistake.
In our experiment, a mistake means they deviate a little bit from their optimal αsegi:y:0 in de-
cision situation segi:y:0 or from their optimal αaggi:y:0 in decision situation aggi:y:0 in terms of
percentage points.13 In other words, the subject chooses the αsegi:y:0 (αaggi:y:0) ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
which lead to her desired risk profile being disturbed by a small error term ². We then ask for
each decision situation if the subject chooses consistently such an α. We next introduce helpful
definitions to make the idea more precise.
Consider three α-values in decision situation 0 to 2 leading to the same total risk posi-
tion called trp (αtrpseg0:0:0; α
trp
seg1:400:0; α
trp
seg2:800:0). Consider now the three intervals [α
trp
seg0:0:0 −
²;αtrpseg0:0:0 + ²], [α
trp
seg1:400:0 − ²;αtrpseg1:400:0 + ²], and [αtrpseg2:800:0 − ²;αtrpseg2:800:0 + ²], which define
a corridor. Note that only one α-value is needed to fully determine a corridor. We use the
αtrpseg0:0:0-value as the parameter to define the corridor. One α
trp
seg0:0:0-value corresponds exactly
to one corridor.
If we assume that a subject chooses according to her true preference, disturbed by a small
error term in every three decision situations, we should find a corridor which contains the chosen
α’s of the subject. In this sense, we will say that this subject acts according to the adjustment
effect.
To express it more mathematically, a corridor fits the data of one subject if an integer
αtrpseg0:0:0 ∈ [αseg0:0:0 − ²;αseg0:0:0 + ²] exists such that
αtrpseg1:400:0 − ² ≤ αseg1:400:0 ≤ αtrpseg1:400:0 + ² and
αtrpseg2:800:0 − ² ≤ αseg2:800:0 ≤ αtrpseg2:800:0 + ²
with ² being a constant, αseg0:0:0, αseg1:400:0, and αseg2:800:0 being the responses of a spe-
cific subject in our experiment, and αtrpseg0:0:0 ± ² ∈ [−100; 400], αtrpseg1:400:0 ± ² ∈ [−100; 400],
αtrpseg2:800:0 ± ² ∈ [−100; 400].
13A second opportunity is to define an error as a deviation in terms of DM amounts, see Appendix C.2.
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Figure 3 illustrates this idea. The three points in both graphs are responses of two hypothet-
ical subjects to decision situations seg0:0:0, seg1:400:0, and seg2:800:0 (or agg0:0:0, agg1:400:0,
and agg2:800:0). For a given ², the upper example shows a corridor which doesn’t fit the data
and the lower example shows a corridor which fits.
Figure 3: Illustration of a Corridor. The upper example shows a corridor which doesn’t fit the data,
i.e. two responses are lying outside the corridor. The lower example shows three different responses.
Every response lies inside the corridor.
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For sufficiently risk averse subjects, the method can be used in a meaningful way. But
assume a risk seeking or risk neutral person who chooses 400 in every decision situation due
to the borrowing constraint. Using our method, we classify this subject as someone who acts
according to the adjustment effect. However, the adjustment effect is meaningless for such a
person, as she would decide to buy as much of the lottery as possible, no matter how large
the exogenous income is. A second concern is our scale from -100 to 400. It is possible that
a risk averse subject prefers a risk profile that leads to αtrpseg2:800:0 > 400. We couldn’t elicit
18
the exact value, but our algorithm judges such a subject as consistent with the adjustment
effect. A subject faces the borrowing constraint in seg2:800:0 if αtrpseg0:0:0 ≥80, and in seg1:400:0
if αtrpseg0:0:0 ≥240. The short sale constraint is binding for seg2:800:0 if αtrpseg0:0:0 ≤-20, and for
seg1:400:0 if αtrpseg0:0:0 ≤-60. The results of the analysis should be interpreted in this light.
Figure 4 shows the smallest possible error rate, so that we can find a fitting corridor for one
subject. For example, if the responses of one subject are αseg0:0:0 = 14, αseg1:400:0 = 26, and
αseg2:800:0 = 75, the smallest possible error rate is 1 with α
trp
seg0:0:0 = 15 defining the best fitting
corridor. Figure 4 shows the smallest possible error rate for every subject and the αtrpseg0:0:0
which defines the best fitting corridor.
The data presented in figure 4 reveals that a notable number of subjects chooses according
to the adjustment effect given reasonable error rates.14 Especially interesting is the remarkable
consistency of a relatively high number of subjects. Remember, that subjects were confronted
with a series of complex decision situations and that the occurrence of the different tasks were
randomized. Clearly, our criterium depends on the definition of a “reasonable” error term.
However, using a relatively restrictive error term of 10 percentage points, 50% of all subjects
choose at least in one of the two treatments according to the adjustment effect.15
It also seems noteworthy that we can identify more consistent people in treatment B than
in treatment A for low error rates (see figure 4 and Appendix C.1). The computation of the
aggregate risk profiles leads to a stronger tendency to choose the same total risk position in all
three relevant decision situations 0:0:0 to 2:800:0 for a group of subjects. It is also evident that
the variance in treatment B is higher. Another group of subjects seemed to have more problems
with the decision tasks in treatment B compared to treatment A.
4.2. The Horizon Effect
We now turn to the horizon effect. Only weak support for hypothesis 2 can be found at
a satisfying significance level (L = 470; p = 0.0541). In contrast, the null hypothesis can
be rejected in treatment B (L = 478.5; p=0.0049**). A closer look at the Wilicoxon tests
reveals a systematic pattern (see table 4). We notice virtually no difference between αˆseg0:0:0
and αˆseg4:400:1/2 (αˆagg0:0:0 and αˆagg4:400:1/2) and a significant effect between αˆseg4:400:1/2 and
αˆseg7:800:1/2 (αˆagg4:400:1/2 and αˆagg7:800:1/2).
14Brennan and Torous (1999) estimate utility losses due to suboptimal equity participation and therefore a
decision problem similar to our decision situations seg0:0:0 to seg2:800:0. They use a constant relative risk
aversion utility function and consider the wealth level required with a suboptimal allocation, to reach the same
level of expected utility under the optimal allocation. The costs of a small deviation from the optimal allocation
are modest, e.g. a 10% error requires approximately a 1% higher wealth level depending on the assumed degree
of risk aversion.
15The table in Appendix C.1 reports on more details for every subject.
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Figure 4: Smallest Possible Error Term for Each Subject in Experiment 1. This figure reports
on details concerning the adjustment effect. The smallest possible error rate for every subject and the
αtrpseg0:0:0-value which defines the best fitting corridor are given. The smallest possible error rates are
presented in ascending order.
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The results are relevant for the ongoing discussion if investors with long time horizons
(should) invest more heavily in risky assets. A riskier portfolio for longer horizons is the ac-
cepted opinion at least outside the academic area. Uncorrelated background risk provides a
rational argument for this (Jagannathan and Kocherlakota 1996). One question that remains
unanswered is whether the salience of the described opinion is mainly due to rational con-
siderations (for example the stated background risk argument) or due to behavioral biases or
bounded rationality. An example which belongs to the latter explanation is a misinterpretation
of the law of large numbers (Samuelson 1963). Our results show that the (rational) argument,
investors with longer time horizons should choose riskier portfolios due to larger (uncorrelated)
background risk, seems for our subjects only to be valid for a high proportion of background
risk to total wealth.
4.3. The Correlation Effect
The reader will recall that hypothesis 3 states that we expect no differences in consequence
of the correlation variations in treatment A. In conformance with this hypothesis, it is not
possible to reject the null hypothesis of a Page test for both proportions of background risk to
total wealth in experiment 1 (BR 400 TDM: L = 470; p = 0.0541 and BR 800 TDM: L = 466.5;
p = 0.1142). Only one of three Page tests is significant in experiment 2 (no increase in risk: L
= 637.5; p = 0.0058**; increase in the exogenous risk: L = 627; p = 0.0687; increase in the
endogenous risk: L = 623; p = 0.1380). In sum, no or at best weak support for a correlation
effect can be found in treatment A.
However, the Wilcoxon tests reported in table 4 reveal a systematic difference. In the
case of a positive correlation (seg5:400:3/4, seg8:800:3/4, seg12:500:3/4, seg15:500:3/4:exo,
seg18:500:3/4:end) subjects choose systematically lower allocations compared to a zero correla-
tion. The difference between a positive and a negative correlation goes against our hypothesis
and is with the exception of one comparison not significant.
A first possibility is that this result is due to loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
The risk communication with the arrow diagrams calls special attention to the possible serve
loss in the decision situations with a positive correlation. The problem with this explanation is
that it should also have an effect on the differences between allocations in the negative and the
zero correlation decision tasks. In the decision situation with the negative correlation the arrow
diagram draws special attention to the fact that the possible serve loss can occur only with a
low probability. However, such an effect is not observable for both amounts of background risk.
Loss aversion can therefore not explain the results in treatment A.
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The following is a second possibility. Imagine that subjects do indeed react according to
the correlation effect. Assume, in addition, that the zero correlation decision tasks are easier to
grasp. Subjects feel more competent in making their decision in the zero correlation situations
and choose therefore a higher allocation. If we assume that both effects overlap, the observed
pattern will result, i.e. no effect between a negative and a zero correlation and a strong difference
for a positive correlation. However, this reasoning is speculative and ex post at best. The
significant drop in the positive correlation decision situations in treatment A remains puzzling.
Using the data from treatment B, we find highly significant support for hypothesis 3a (Ex-
periment 1: BR 400 TDM: L = 477; p = 0.0080** and BR 800 TDM: L = 478; p = 0.0058**;
Experiment 2: no increase in risk: L = 647.5; p = 0.0002***; increase in the exogenous risk: L
= 601.5; p = 0.1493; increase in the endogenous risk: L = 634.6; p = 0.0129*). The Wilicoxon
tests are also in line with the hypothesis (see table 4). With only one exception, all possible
comparisons differ in the predicted direction and they are in most cases significant.
The qualitative differences between treatments A and B are obvious for the correlation ef-
fect. In treatment A we replicate the well-known fact that correlations are largely neglected
in financial decision making. However, the picture changes for treatment B. To our knowledge
this is one of the first experimental scenarios which documents a qualitative correct processing
of correlations in a financial context. The comparison with the results of treatment A shows
that the explicit computation of aggregate risk profiles is necessary to obtain this result. De-
cision situations are equivalent in terms of final wealth changes, but the overall perspective in
treatment B is different and seemingly helpful. The analysis supports our view that explicit
computation of the aggregated risk profiles helps subjects to partly overcome the deviations
from normative theories due to neglect of correlations, or put differently, helps them to make
“better” decisions.
4.4. Differences Between the Treatments
Up to now, we have mainly presented results separately for both treatments. A self-evident
question is whether there are any systematic differences between the responses in treatment
A and treatment B. The following table 5 reports the results of Wilcoxon tests between every
equivalent decision situation.
We observe a systematic effect for a risky exogenous income of 800 TDM (decision situations
6:800:1/4 to 8:800:3/4). Subjects invest a larger fraction of financial wealth in treatment B.
Maybe this is due to underestimating the high impact of the exogenous income part. Necessary
or desired high adjustments in the split of financial wealth may be more obvious in treatment
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Table 5: Differences Between the Treatments A and B. The table addresses the question of whether
there are any systematic differences between treatments A and B. The reported numbers belong to
Wilcoxon tests between every equivalent decision situations.
Wilcoxon-Tests
Decision Situation Test Statistic p-value
0 (seg0:0:0 vs. agg0:0:0) -0.087 0.9306
1 (seg1:400:0 vs. agg1:400:0) 1.661 0.0967
2 (seg2:800:0 vs. agg2:800:0) -0.916 0.3597
3 (seg3:400:1/4 vs. agg3:400:1/4) -1.182 0.2371
4 (seg4:400:1/2 vs. agg4:400:1/2) 0.595 0.5519
5 (seg5:400:3/4 vs. agg5:400:3/4) -0.602 0.5472
6 (seg6:800:1/4 vs. agg6:800:1/4) -2.988 0.0028**
7 (seg7:800:1/2 vs. agg7:800:1/2) -2.188 0.0287*
8 (seg8:800:3/4 vs. agg8:800:3/4) -1.703 0.0885
B. Besides this, no systematic effect is observed. An analogous analysis for experiment 2 also
reveals no result which may be of relevance for the three effects considered in this paper. The
test statistics are given in Appendix D.
Differences exist between equivalent decision situations, but the results are not sufficient
to establish a systematic framing effect. Differences seem to appear randomly, apart from the
qualitative discrepancies discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
5. Incentives and Subject Pool
One general caveat against the experimental investigation of portfolio choice behavior is that
the incentives are too low, so that the observed behavior has no relevance for the behavior
in markets. However, our results should still hold if we take the experimental evidence on
the effect of incentives into account. Binswanger (1980), Binswanger (1981), Kachelmeier and
Shehata (1992) and Holt and Laury (2002) report that subjects behave more risk averse if all
payoffs are scaled up. In our experiment, the hypotheses are not affected by a greater degree of
risk aversion. If somebody is more risk averse when higher stakes are at hand, she will choose
a lower exposure to the risky asset on average. But the qualitative relationships tested here
(“the overall decision pattern”) should still hold. This conjecture is consistent with previous
research. For example, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) elicit certainty equivalents for a couple
of different lotteries and they report the same general dependence between the average ratio
of the certainty equivalent to expected value and the percentage of winning for high and low
monetary incentives. The degree of risk aversion changes in their experiments as they increase
the stakes, but they observe no difference in the overall decision pattern. Further experimental
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results have also shown that subjects seem to behave more in line with normative theories (more
“rational”) when the payments are high.16 Note, that the subjects in our experiments already
behave in line with the normative theory. If we increase the monetary incentives, this picture
should emerge even stronger and therefore strengthen our results. The only exception may be
the neglect of correlations in treatment A. But for this particular question our results may be
interpreted as in line with field data studies, which document ambiguous results. One possible
interpretation of the field data results is that people do not take the correlation structure into
account and that therefore the ambiguous picture observed in field data sets emerges. Also note
that the comparison of the two described treatments is most important for our experiment. We
have shown that the computation of aggregated risk profiles helps people to take the correlation
structure into account. From our point of view, it is possible (but not likely) that on average
a correct processing of correlations in treatment A may be observed if we increase the stakes.
However, there is no reason to believe that the computation of aggregated risk profiles would
be useless for higher incentives.
A second common caveat addresses the subject pool. It is often argued in two completely
different ways. The first line of reasoning says that finance students are too clever. They know
about at least some basic portfolio choice concepts and therefore it is not surprising that the
results are in line with the theory. The second line of reasoning says that finance students are not
clever enough. Professional institutional investors would never make the mistakes that students
do (for example neglect correlations). There exists some evidence that the last statement may
not be true. For example, Haigh and List (2004) show that professional traders exhibit a greater
degree of myopic loss aversion than a student control group. Furthermore, Sarin and Weber
(1993) investigate the effects of ambiguity in market experiments with students and experienced
bond traders. They find that ambiguity aversion does not vanish in a market setting for both
subject groups and they especially observe no significant difference in behavior between students
and traders. There is also evidence that the first statement may not be true. Finance students
can indeed make systematic mistakes in portfolio choice experiments and the observed rational
behavior in this experiment is in no way tautological.17
Potential differences between students, traders, and other subgroups of the population is an
interesting and active research field. In any case, we consider the finance student subject pool
as suitable for the questions at hand. They are highly motivated to think about such problems
and they shortly will have to decide about their strategic asset allocation or have already had to
16Kroll et. al. (1988) present experimental evidence in a portfolio choice context.
17See for this particular decision context the portfolio choice experiments cited above or in general the re-
view from Camerer (1995) of the individual decision making literature. For example, students make systematic
mistakes in Baysian updating even if they know about Bayes Rule.
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decide about their strategic asset allocation. From our point of view, their intrinsic motivation,18
which may not necessarily be expected by professional traders or non-finance students, is the
best argument for using finance students in this relatively difficult and newly-made experiment.
6. Summary
This paper adds to the empirical literature on portfolio choice in the presence of nontradeable
income by reporting the results of experiments. The experimental approach makes a direct
causal interpretation possible and leads to within-subject data.
In most cases, the theoretical literature predicts the behavior of our subjects in the complex
decision situations quite well. Subjects adjust their proportion of financial wealth invested in the
risky asset as a result of higher and certain nontradeable payments in the predicted direction.
Higher amounts of uncorrelated background risk lead to higher exposures to the risky asset.
We communicate correlations by the use of conditional probabilities. Correlations are largely
ignored using a segregated description of the decision problem. However, the computation of
aggregated risk profiles helps subjects to partly overcome the deviations from normative theory
due to neglect of correlations. Further research has to clarify under which circumstances the
computation of aggregate risk profiles helps people to behave “more rationally”. This seems to
be especially interesting in a financial context.
We only considered the data for the adjustment effect with respect to quantitative dif-
ferences, since this is the only effect we could analyze concerning point predictions without
assuming a specific preference calculus. Utilizing a small error, we can classify a relatively high
proportion of our subjects as choosing consistent with the adjustment effect.
18Note furthermore, that all participants agreed voluntary to participate in an experiment announced as an
experiment on individual decision making.
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A. Screenshots
A.1. Treatment A
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A.2. Treatment B
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B. Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations of Chosen Alloca-
tions
B.1. Experiment 1
The following table contains the median, mean, and standard deviation of the chosen allocations
for every decision situation in treatments A and B for experiment 1.
Descriptive Statistics - Experiment 1
decision situation median mean standard deviation
seg0:0:0 75 112 131
seg1:400:0 92.5 131 126
seg2:800:0 150 194 139
seg3:400:1/4 66.5 100 139
seg4:400:1/2 64.5 117 137
seg5:400:3/4 36.5 84 125
seg6:800:1/4 100 137 142
seg7:800:1/2 95 139 155
seg8:800:3/4 67.5 106 145
agg0:0:0 100 120 123
agg1:400:0 51.5 112 130
agg2:800:0 241 226 154
agg3:400:1/4 70.5 131 132
agg4:400:1/2 68.5 109 148
agg5:400:3/4 30 98 161
agg6:800:1/4 244.5 214 169
agg7:800:1/2 219.5 216 172
agg8:800:3/4 223 160 209
B.2. Experiment 2
The following table contains the median, mean, and standard deviation of the chosen allocations
for every decision situation in treatments A and B for experiment 2.
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Descriptive Statistics - Experiment 2
decision situation median mean standard deviation
seg9 : 500 : 0 100 148 127
seg10 : 500 : 1/4 100 132 118
seg11 : 500 : 1/2 98 128 120
seg12 : 500 : 3/4 70 105 115
seg13 : 500 : 1/4 : exo 75 111 116
seg14 : 500 : 1/2 : exo 80 102 102
seg15 : 500 : 3/4 : exo 50 105 128
seg16 : 500 : 1/4 : end 88 128 132
seg17 : 500 : 1/2 : end 100 133 111
seg18 : 500 : 3/4 : end 80 115 117
agg9 : 500 : 0 95 154 154
agg10 : 500 : 1/4 161 171 120
agg11 : 500 : 1/2 108 153 142
agg12 : 500 : 3/4 101 105 152
agg13 : 500 : 1/4 : exo 233 218 121
agg14 : 500 : 1/2 : exo 195 171 137
agg15 : 500 : 3/4 : exo 170 157 166
agg16 : 500 : 1/4 : end 58 84 99
agg17 : 500 : 1/2 : end 69 104 128
agg18 : 500 : 3/4 : end 40 74 123
29
C. The Error Term Analysis
C.1. Further Details on the Error Term Analysis
This table reports on details of every subject concerning the error analysis of adjustment effect. The
left column contains an identification number for every subject. For treatment A, we report the smallest
possible error term (SPET) and the αtrpseg:0:0-value, which defines the fitting corridor in the second and
third column. The forth and fifth columns contain the same type of information for treatment B.
Nr. Treatment A Treatment B Nr. Treatment A Treatment B
SPET αtrpseg:0:0 SPET α
trp
agg:0:0 SPET α
trp
seg:0:0 SPET α
trp
agg:0:0
1 50 30 26 56 20 71 54 2 23
2 48 32 2 62 21 75 75 47 103
3 0 80 25 38 22 38 112 0 100
4 0 400 99 202 23 13 22 0 0
5 15 13 100 16 24 25 15 5 22
6 67 263 0 400 25 100 30 29 5
7 42 38 50 9 26 25 45 7 1
8 100 100 97 42 27 25 25 84 4
9 67 33 30 18 28 0 400 0 400
10 17 33 66 9 29 26 49 11 114
11 10 48 1 62 30 88 187 285 115
12 46 29 124 154 31 20 20 29 5
13 26 49 73 65 32 15 19 98 79
14 63 22 60 59 33 75 45 0 100
15 5 15 76 64 34 55 27 72 66
16 9 16 74 56 35 32 21 0 0
17 0 400 2 239 36 10 34 64 18
18 0 -100 88 48 37 50 50 11 166
19 0 400 0 400 38 165 235 114 51
C.2. An Alternative Specification of the Error Term
Denominate βsegi:y:q the amount of money invested in the lottery. (The rest of the denomination is
analogous to section 4.1.) We assume 50 TDM and 100 TDM to be reasonable error rates.
A corridor fits the data of one subject if there exist an integer βtrpseg0:0:0 ∈ [βseg0:0:0 − ²;βseg0:0:0 + ²]
such that
βtrpseg1:400:0 − ² ≤ βseg1:400:0 ≤ βtrpseg1:400:0 + ² and
βtrpseg2:800:0 − ² ≤ βseg2:800:0 ≤ βtrpseg2:800:0 + ²
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with ² being a constant, βseg0:0:0, βseg1:400:0, and βseg2:800:0 being the responses of a specific subject in our
experiment, and βtrpseg0:0:0 ± ² ∈ [−1000; 4000], βtrpseg1:400:0 ± ² ∈ [−600; 2400], βtrpseg2:800:0 ± ² ∈ [−200; 800].
Using the amount of money invested in the lottery as a measure, a completely rational response is
βseg0:0:0=βseg1:400:0=βseg2:800:0.
This table reports on details of every subject concerning the error analysis of adjustment effect. The
left column contains an identification number for every subject. For treatment A, we report the smallest
possible error term (SPET) and the βtrpseg:0:0-value, which defines the fitting corridor in the second and
third column. The forth and fifth columns contain the same type of information for treatment B.
Nr. Treatment A Treatment B Nr. Treatment A Treatment B
SPET βtrpseg:0:0 SPET β
trp
agg:0:0 SPET β
trp
seg:0:0 SPET β
trp
agg:0:0
1 275 475 99 512 20 550 700 11 239
2 194 418 2 618 21 300 1200 375 1125
3 2 802 191 419 22 300 1200 1 1001
4 0 4000 606 2404 23 50 250 0 0
5 58 157 595 565 24 150 150 32 218
6 402 2898 0 4000 25 395 505 114 114
7 250 550 211 209 26 100 500 40 40
8 400 1600 386 616 27 150 350 335 -135
9 400 600 116 116 28 0 4000 0 4000
10 100 400 398 92 29 151 391 85 1165
11 40 460 4 616 30 700 1700 1886 2114
12 275 475 988 1792 31 120 120 115 115
13 189 561 579 801 32 85 255 780 990
14 325 425 239 467 33 300 600 1 1001
15 28 128 604 796 34 290 460 286 514
16 33 183 299 711 35 126 276 0 0
17 0 4000 15 2385 36 44 366 256 52
18 0 -1000 350 660 37 300 700 90 1680
19 0 4000 0 4000 38 1044 2956 451 743
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D. Differences between the two treatments in experiment 2
Wilcoxon-Tests
Decision Situation Test Statistic p-value
9 (seg9:500:0 vs. agg9:500:0) 0.141 0.8882
10 (seg10:500:1/4 vs. agg10:500:1/4) -2.161 0.0307*
11 (seg11:500:1/2 vs. agg11:500:1/2) -1.144 0.2526
12 (seg12:500:3/4 vs. agg12:500:3/4) 0.023 0.9813
13 (seg13:500:1/4:exo vs. agg13:500:1/4:exo) -4.748 0.0000***
14 (seg14:500:1/2:exo vs. agg14:500:1/2:exo) -3.126 0.0018**
15 (seg15:500:3/4:exo vs. agg15:500:3/4:exo) -1.898 0.0576
16 (seg16:500:1/4:end vs. agg16:500:1/4:end) 1.589 0.1120
17 (seg17:500:1/2:end vs. agg17:500:1/2:end) 2.095 0.0361*
18 (seg18:500:3/4:end vs. agg18:500:3/4:end) 2.273 0.0230*
Note, that the tests above document lower investments in treatment A for an increase in the exogenous
risk and higher investments for an increase in the endogenous risk. This and further results of our
experiment 2 are issues of ongoing research.
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